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BOOK COMMENTARY
THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES. By HARRY H. WELLINGTON AND
RALPH K. WINTER, JR. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute.
1971. xiii + 226 pages. $7.95.*
STEPHEN R. GOLDSTEINt
In this short and very readable volume Professors Wellington and
Winter discuss the political, economic, and legal problems faced by
American cities and other local governing units as a result of the
growing use of collective bargaining in the public sector. Although
the book contains a considerable amount of general information
about the current status and practices of public employment bargain-
ing, the main significance of the work is the authors' thesis that the
collective bargaining model-including strikes-that has developed in
the private sector should not be fully extended into the public sector.
In so stating, the authors take direct issue with what they accurately
describe as "fast becoming the conventional wisdom"' concerning
public employee labor relations. This conventional wisdom is repre-
sented by statements such as that of Mr. Theodore Kheel quoted in the
first paragraph of chapter one of The Unions and the Cities:
In the public sector, as in the private, Mr. Kheel argues, "the most
effective technique to produce acceptable terms to resolve disputes is
voluntary agreement of the parties, and the best system we have for
producing agreements between groups is collective bargaining-even
though it involves conflict and the possibility of a work disruption." 2
In rejecting the Kheel argument about public employee bargain-
ing, Wellington and Winter state that they do accept fully developed
collective bargaining in the private sector.3 However, this acceptance
seems to be grudging and it is difficult to believe that their views as to
collective bargaining in the public sector, particularly concerning the
adverse effects of strikes, are not at least colored by their lack of
enthusiasm for it generally. Be that as it may, their argument in this
* This Book Review is an adaptation of a paper which was delivered at the Labor
Law Round Table of the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting,
December 28, 1971, Chicago, Ill.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1959; LL.B., 1962.
i. P. 7.
2. Id.
3. Pp. 2-3, 7-8.
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book does not explicitly rest on a general dislike of full collective bar-
gaining. Rather it relies on their distinctions between the public sec-
tor and the private sector concerning collective bargaining.
Wellington and Winter rely on two interrelated but analytically
separate bases for limiting public sector bargaining as compared to
private sector bargaining. The first is that the structure of the public
market as compared to the strucure of the private market is such that
public employee unions have potentially greater economic power than
do private employee unions.4 The second is that the decision-making
process in the public arena is different from that in the private.5
In keeping with the theme of this special section on education and
the law and with my professional field of interest in the law governing
public education below the college level, I would like to explore the
Wellington and Winter thesis in the context of collective bargaining
in public education. I feel further justified in exploring their thesis
in this context as Wellington and Winter themselves recognize teacher
collective bargaining as an important component of public employee
bargaining generally and, indeed, specifically discuss it at various points
in their study.6
In terms of public education, collective bargaining must be viewed
as a method of educational decision making, with teachers viewed as
a group competing for educational decision-making power with such
other groups as administrators, school boards, community leaders, par-
ents, students, legislatures and, indeed, courts. From this perspective,
the general thrust of Wellington and Winter to treat teacher collective
bargaining differently from private employee bargaining and in so
doing to limit it in scope and power seems correct. I reach this con-
clusion, however, on slightly different reasoning than do the authors,
and also wish to suggest somewhat different mechanisms for limiting
teacher collective bargaining.
In the Wellington and Winter private sector model, there are re-
straints on union demands produced by the need to maintain the em-
ployer's competitive posture. If wage increases result in higher product
prices, decreases in consumer demand may result in employment re-
ductions.7 They do not, however, believe that similar restraints exist in
the public employment model." In so concluding, they necessarily reject
4. Pp. 15-24, 29-32.
5. Pp. 21-32, 59-65.
6. E.g., pp. 27-29, 137-42.
7. Pp. 15-17.
8. Pp. 17-21.
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the argument that taxpayer action to keep taxes low is analogous to
consumer action in the private sector.
At least as applied to teacher collective bargaining, however, this
dichotomy based on market restraints or their absence may well be
inapposite. Although the percentages vary from state to state and the
trend has been to greater state and federal financing of education, the
the average local component of educational finance is still approxi-
mately 52 percent.
As the authors themselves recognize, school districts are not typ-
ical governmental units.9 Most school districts in this country are inde-
pendent of other political entities. They raise their own taxes with a
specially designated property tax that is very visible to the taxpayer.
Indeed, even when school districts are not fiscally independent, school
taxes are often made highly visible by a special property tax levy for
schools. Thus, the costs of education are not just another item in a
complex municipal budget as is true, for example, with police, fire,
sanitation, etc. Nor is the responsibility for local school taxes generally
seen by the public as divided among different governmental entities.
Most school boards are elected and their members held responsible
by the electorate for school tax increases. Moreover, in many areas
the taxpayers themselves vote on tax increases or bond offerings.
Finally, and most significantly, different groups of taxpayers view
themselves differentially as consumers of educational services in a way
not common to many other governmental services, particularly local
government services. Thus, the pressure to settle a strike so as to restore
the service and the acceptance of high taxes in order to retain the
quality of service despite rising costs is not universally felt among the
electorate. In terms of their perception of the value of public edu-
cation, taxpayers may be distributed along the following continuum
from highest to lowest perceived value: parents of children in public
schools; people with no children of school age; and parents of chil-
dren in private schools, particularly parochial schools. This last group
particularly feels a "double taxation" burden in relation to private
education costs and taxation and presents a strong consumer reluctant
force. The consumer reluctance of the middle group, those without
children in any school, particularly the retired on fixed incomes,
is also increased by the perceived regressive nature of the property
tax-a burden this group feels acutely.
9. See pp. 198-201.
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These factors lead me to conclude that it is not at all clear that
the economic structure leads to teachers' unions having greater eco-
nomic power than private-sector unions.
Moreover, Wellington and Winter's reliance for their argument
in favor of restricting public employee bargaining power on the
greater monopsony power of the employer in the private sector and
thus the greater need for union countervailing power in that sector 0
also does not seem applicable in terms of education, even if it is gen-
erally true. Specific teacher training is not easily transferable to other
fields; nor is teacher experience. There is, of course, a private school
teaching market, but this is presently quite limited in positions and
underpaid in relation to public school teaching. It is also true that the
public school system cannot go out of business as can a private busi-
ness, but this fact would seem to be offset by the strong consumer re-
luctance interest operating in education.
There is, however, one unique aspect of teacher strikes not dis-
cussed by Wellington and Winter that does make them more effective
than strikes by private employees, and, indeed, by other government
employees. Teachers generally do not lose working time and wages by
striking. This occurs because state laws require a minimum number
of teaching days, either absolutely or in order for the school district to
receive state funds. Since most school systems schedule only a few days
over these minima, days lost by teacher strikes must generally be made
up, with the teachers being paid for the make-up time. Thus, for exam-
ple, despite a three-week teacher strike in Philadelphia this year, the
teachers will receive their full salary since they will be paid for the
sixteen extra days added to the school calendar to make up for school
days lost during the strike.
Further, even without collective bargaining teachers have achieved
a number of significant collective bargaining goals which decrease
the need for increasing union power. Job security is well protected by
tenure, concepts of academic freedom and the like. Teachers indi-
vidually and collectively, even without collective bargaining, tra-
ditionally have had a significant input into educational decision
making. Finally, in terms of a teacher's day-to-day control of his class-
room, he has exerted, and continues to exert, enormous influence.
This political reality of teacher control has even been further ad-
vanced by doctrines such as legal protection of academic freedom.
10. Pp. 15-24.
BOOK COMMENTARY
These facts of teacher protection and power not only diminish
the need for powerful unions as compared with the private sector,
they also raise the issue of whether it is politically and socially wise to
augment that power with strong collective bargaining. This leads us
to Wellington and Winter's second reason for restricting public em-
ployee bargaining: the nature of public body decision making. On
this point, I am in general agreement: public employee bargaining
should be restricted as compared to the private sector by the essentially
political nature of the decision making in the public sector." In this
context, teachers compete for educational decision-making power with
such other groups as administrators, parents, community leaders, and
students.
As the authors so well put it, it is not whether teachers should
participate in educational decision-making process, but how and with
what power they should do so.12 Collective bargaining on nonwage
issues has often been seen as a situation in which teachers and admin-
istrators are adversaries. Yet in recent years, issues have often pitted
teachers and administrators-the professionals-against lay groups.
In such cases, the already significant power of teachers suggested
above is augmented greatly. The fact that the professionals are on
the scene daily as compared with all the lay adult groups, including
the school board, gives them an important source of power in the
realities of decision making and decision implementation. I share
Wellington and Winter's concern about the wisdom of augmenting
this with strong collective bargaining, particularly on nonwage issues.
Thus, I would favor a number of their suggestions, such as third party
involvement in bargaining.
My concerns, however, go beyond the issue of teachers having
increased power through collective bargaining. I am concerned about
the bargaining technique itself as a method of educational decision
making. This concern exists whether or not there are additional par-
ties particpating in the bargaining process.
The bargaining technique necessarily implies culmination in one
contract of the different issues negotiated. This means trade-offs. I
disagree with Wellington and Winter's contention that there are less
trade-offs in teacher bargaining than in the private sector.'3 The prob-
11. See pp. 21-32, 59-65.
12. P. 24.
13. See p. 23.
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lem is that there are too many. Many dissimilar issues can be reduced
to economic terms and even noneconomic issues are subject to trade-
offs. The normal union practice of describing an agreement in pack-
age terms, primarily economic, demonstrates and reenforces this
tendency. I would suggest that this is not a good method of educa-
tional decision making no matter who the contracting parties are.
Moreover, the contract is a document, presumably of binding
legal effect, that has a life that might extend to three or more years.
Thus the effect of embodying a decision in a contract is to limit the
ability of the school board to change direction, to adapt to new prob-
lems, to discontinue ideas that don't work. This is aggravated by the
difficulty a school board has when it attempts to bargain out of a new
contract a "gain" achieved by the teachers in a preceding one.
In my view, therefore, the issue is not predominantly that of
the right to strike but the structure of collective bargaining. This
structure could be discussed in terms of mandatory and permissible
subjects of bargaining. In general, I would favor a relatively narrow
range of mandatory subjects of bargaining. I will not attempt to
define that range in the space of this review.
The issue of the scope of permissible subjects of collective bar-
gaining and contract resolution is more complex. It essentially is the
issue of the old delegation doctrine' 4-a doctrine that is being re-
pudiated and, I believe, properly so, in terms of its absolutist legal
theory which could preclude all teacher collective bargaining in the
absence of explicit legislative authorization.' 5 But the doctrine has an
underlying core of validity in that it requires that those who have been
selected by a given process and from a given constitutency retain
the power to make ultimate policy decisions and override decisions
made by others.' 6 In terms of teacher collective bargaining there may
be some subjects-acutely sensitive and quantitatively, if not qualita-
tively, removed from wages and hours-about which school boards
14. For discussion of the classic doctrine see LEGAL PROBLEM,1S OF SCHOOL BOARDS
7-18 (Rezny ed. 1966); K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 9 (1958, Supp.
1970); Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 HA.v. L. REv. 201 (1937).
15. See Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951) ; K. DAvis, supra note 14. See also pp. 41-43.
16. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151-56
(1970); cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-86 (1965);
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 387-89 & n.60
(1967).
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cannot contractually bind themselves for an extended period of
time.17
In addition, a recent decision in New Jersey suggests the develop-
ment of a doctrine limiting the effect of nonmandatory collective
bargaining without reliance on a rigid delegation approach. Porcelli v.
Titus'I involved a three-year collective bargaining agreement entered
into between the Newark Board of Education and the Newark Teach-
ers Association, which provided, inter alia, for the filling of principal-
ships by appointment in order of numerical ranking from a list de-
termined by written and oral examinations. In the second year of the
contract, the School Board abolished the numerical list and decided
to appoint principals outside the list on the grounds that there were
insufficient black and other minority group members on the list and
that the Newark educational system required an increase in the num-
ber of black and other minority group principals in order to function
properly. The New Jersey Education Commission upheld the School
Board's action against a breach of contract claim brought by a group
of teachers. 9 This decision was affirmed by the New Jersey Superior
Court. In so doing, both the Commissioner and court considered the
contract provision an appropriate subject of bargaining and agree-
ment. They did not rely on the delegation doctrine20 to uphold the
School Board action apparently in violation of the contract. Rather,
they based their decision on the fact that under the circumstances
present in Newark continued adherence to the contractual provision
created "a real threat or obstacle" to the proper administration of
the school system, and this fact allowed the board to abrogate the
otherwise lawful and binding contract provision.21 In so deciding,
the court cited the contract doctrine of impossibility of performance.
This reliance on the private contract doctrine of impossibility is
questionable contract law, to say the least. Moreover, the decision is
unclear as to the perimeters of the doctrine enunciated and the theory
if any, of its public law basis. These and other aspects of the decision
17. See the discussion by Wellington and Winter of issues of class size, discipline,
and curriculum, pp. 137-42.
18. 108 N.J. Super. 301, 261 A.2d 364 (1969).
19. Porcelli v. Titus, N.J. Commissioner of Educ. Decision [hereinafter cited as
Commissioner's Decision]. (Copy on file in the offices of the Buffalo Law Review.) This
decision is referred to extensively in the court's opinion.
20. Commissioner's Decision at 8-11; 108 N.J. Super. at 307-09; 261 A.2d at 367-68.
21. Commissioner's Decision at 11-12; 108 N.J. Super. at 309-13; 261 A.2d at
368-70. The court opinion explicitly refers to quotes from the Commissioner's opinion
on these points.
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are quite troublesome. However, the practical effect of the approach
of Porcelli is quite attractive in light of the concerns I have ex-
pressed herein. Porcelli does not, of course, address itself to the con-
cern of the nature of the negotiating and contracting process. It
does, however, limit the effect of a school board being bound by a
contract on sensitive issues during dynamic times. Moreover, it does
so in a way that minimizes the theoretical and practical problems of
the unrestrained delegation doctrine.
Both the Education Commissioner and the court emphasized the
normally binding effect of collective bargaining agreements and
treated the board's action here as highly exceptional.22 The action
was upheld on the basis of the persuasive need of Newark to do
something to obtain a greater number of minority group principals.
Although the existence and effect of the need did not seem to have
been subject to significant review either by the Education Commis-
sioner or the court in this case, the court did suggest that their doc-
trine requires review of the school board's determination of necessity
in such cases.
Even if outside review of the school board's determination of
necessity is minimal or nonexistent, the Porcelli doctrine is more
protective of collective bargaining than is the old delegation doc-
trine. Under Porcelli the school board must act to set aside the con-
tractual provision in question. The delegation doctrine allows outside
groups to attack and enjoin enforcement of agreements. While it may
be argued that an outside group would not gain anything by enjoining
a contract provision that the school board wants to honor, this argu-
ment misses the real dynamics involved. It is much easier for an out-
side group to attack an agreement and the school board not to honor
it after it has been enjoined from enforcing the contract, than it is for
the school board itself to initiate abrogation of an agreement which
it has signed. Not only is there the restraint of a school board's
keeping its word generally, but the board has an ongoing relationship
with the union that requires it to adhere to contracts except in the
most extreme situations. The Porcelli rationale thus affords the school
board an escape clause for extreme situations. It thus may present a
practical compromise between the old delegation doctrine and one of
no restraint on permissible subjects of bargaining or the duration of
contractually binding agreements.
22. Id.
